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The incorporation of American Indian law into the study of
Constitutional Law accomplishes a number of pedagogical goals as well
as understanding questions concerning American Indian law that
naturally evolve in the study. This broadened understanding of the
United States Constitution helps to explain the complex subject of
opinion writing and the role of politics in reading United States Supreme
Court decisions. From a practice perspective, the incorporation of
American Indian law into a Constitutional Law study further serves the
purpose of explaining legal distinctions, which enable future
practitioners to be knowledgeable in "spotting" issues where clients
present such facts.
In the first introduction of the Constitutional Law class, it takes
only a few minutes to raise the subject of Indians in the United States
Constitution. This discussion helps to lay the groundwork for the issues
that arise throughout the course.
Mentioning Indian issues may be problematic because of the
question concerning the "politically correct"' term for referring to
America's indigenous people. "American Indian" has been the term
frequently used in cases and in legal contexts; and the term "Native
American" has been recently adopted to encompass not only the
indigenous people of the continental United States, but the Alaskan
Natives as well.
2
If you address the Articles of Confederation, this is a good time to
point out that relations with Indians provided a good bit of the impetus
* Victoria Sutton is an Associate Professor of Law at Texas Tech University School of
Law. She is Secretary of the National Native American Bar Association for 2001-2002 and
a member of the Lumbee Nation.
1. Colloquial term for framing issues in a politically acceptable manner, sensitive to all
political viewpoints.
2. Both the American Association of Law Schools Section and the National Native
American Bar Association have considered these references. The decision for both legal
groups has been for inclusion, rather than exclusion.
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to create the document that arose from the Constitutional Convention of
1787, held to simply amend the Articles of Confederation.3 It was from
that convention that the Constitution of the United States was drafted.
Article III of the Articles notes that, "the said states hereby severally
enter into a firm league of friendship with each other." This basis of
friendship, however, held none of the power needed to collect taxes,
defend the country, pay the public debt or to encourage trade and
commerce-some of the most important issues for the new country.
Indian nations were particularly important in trade and commerce,
which gave rise to the mention of Indians in three parts of the
Constitution.
Charles Pickney from South Carolina, a state that had a history in
Indian trade dating back to the seventeenth century, proposed the
Indian commerce clause. The Indian Commerce Clause was constructed
to place power in the federal government. Among the enumerated
powers of the federal government is the power "[tio regulate
commerce... with the Indian Tribes."
4
Indians are also mentioned in Article I, section 2, clause 3, which
provides, "[r]epresentatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among
the several states ... which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free persons, including those bound to service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons."5
And in 1868, the exclusion of Indians was reaffirmed in the
Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, "Representatives shall be
apportioned among the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding
Indians not taxed .... 6
II. MARSHALL CoURT-THE MADISON V. MARBURYOF INDIAN LAW
A discussion of the Marshall court typically introduces the concept
of opinion writing and Chief Justice John Marshall's approach to
preserving the power of the United States Supreme Court in its early
days. The cases of Marbury v. Madison7 and Martin v. Hunter's LesseeB
3. Article IX of the Articles of the Confederation, vested the Continental Congress "With
the sole and exclusive right and power of... regulating the trade and managing all affairs
with Indians not members of any of the states; provided that the legislative right of any
state within its own limits by not infringed or violated...." Journals of the Continental
Congress vol. 33, 457-59 (U.S. Govt. 1909-1937). See The Federalist No. 42 (James
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., N.Y. New Am. Library 1961) ("The regulation of commerce with
the Indian Tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles of
confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory.").
4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
6. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
7. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
8. 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
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can be elucidated by the Marshall courfs Indian law cases.
A. Federalism
The Federalist Papers, which helped explain the provisions of the
United States Constitution prior to ratification in 1787, discuss the
powers apportioned to the states and the federal government in terms of
state sovereignty.9 But how did the sovereignty of Indian tribes figure in
this careful balance of sovereign powers?
In Johnson v. M'Intosh,'0 Chief Justice Marshall addressed the
question of whether Indian tribes had the authority to transfer title to
land occupied by the Indians." The Marshall court found that the tribes
must have some sovereignty in order to possess any title to transfer;
however, not enough sovereignty to prevent their subjugation to the
federal government. 2  The thrust of this determination was that
Indigenous peoples do not have the natural rights of citizens of "civilized"
nations, but they were admitted to be "the rightful occupants of the soil,
with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it .... "13
Complete sovereignty was diminished, and power to dispose of soil was
denied: giving to the discoverer exclusive title by virtue of "Discovery.
" 14
Injustiying the doctrine of discovery, Justice Marshall said,
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an
inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been
asserted in the first instance, and afterwards, sustained; if a country has
been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of the
community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be
questioned.'
5
This case was important because it defined the sovereignty of the tribes
in relation to the states and the federal government. In defining
sovereignty, Justice Marshall used as a premise that the United States is
sovereign and therefore Indian Tribes cannot also be sovereign.' 6 Chief
Justice Marshall reasoned that while the doctrines of discovery and
conquest were nothing more than pretenses; nevertheless, they were the
foundation of property rights for all white Americans, and he was
compelled to uphold them. Marshall could not conclude that the
Indians had the same fee-simple title as other citizens because their title
would remain wholly unaffected by their lands' discovery by white
9. The Federalist No. 39 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., N.Y. New Am. Library 1961).
10. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
11. Id.
12. See id. at 603-04.
13. See id. at 574.
14. Id.
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Europeans. Chief Justice Marshall held that tribes had extinguished the
title of the plaintiffs by selling it again to the United States.17 Thus, the
doctrines of discovery and conquest defined the sovereignty of tribal
governments.
B. The Marbury v. Madison of Indian Law
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,18 the United States Supreme Court
confronted the Virginia Supreme Court on interpretation of the
Constitution and remanded the Virginia decision to the consternation of
the Virginians. The Supreme Court's assumption of appellate
jurisdiction over state supreme courts was seen by many as a blow to
state sovereignty.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,'9 the federalism concept was tested
again. The Georgia Court had declared that all Indian land belonged to
20the state. Missionaries were going into the reservation creating
conflicts with the state of Georgia, so Georgia asserted civil jurisdiction
over the Cherokee lands. 2' This placed the question of state and federal
powers directly before the courts, again, on the issue of whether Georgia
or the federal government had jurisdiction over the tribal governments.
In making this decision, the court again had to address the sovereign
status of tribal governments, because to refer to Indian nations as
"foreign States," as England or France, would confer original jurisdiction
22in the United States Supreme Court. Indian tribes are not "foreign
nations" under the Constitution, but rather defined in this case as
"domestic, dependent nations. "2
Through this decision, the United States Supreme Court avoided
giving primary jurisdiction to tribal governments to litigate with states,
yet determined the status of tribal governments in its dicta and ultimate
dismissal of the case. Because the greatest impact of this case on law
and on history was derived from this dicta, it is considered the Marbury
v. Madison of Indian law.24
In Worcester v. Georgia,2 5 the United States Supreme Court was
faced with another controversy between the state of Georgia and the
Cherokee Nation. Here, a missionary, Worcester, had been jailed
17. See id. at 604-05.
18. 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
19. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
20. IcL at 15.
21. Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians, American Justice 28-29 (U. of
Tex. Press 1983).
22. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
23. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
24. The reference to the case being known as the Marbury v. Madison of American Indian
law was a statement made by Nell Jessup Newton at American University, August 29.
1996.
25. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
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because he had failed to comply with the registration of missionaries
required by Georgia state law.26
The court determined that the state of Georgia had no authority
over the Cherokee Nation; therefore they had no right to arrest Worcester
and should have released him from jail.27
Thus, Johnson was implicitly overruled by the recognition of
sovereignty in Worcester. Nevertheless, it is still cited regularly and
relied upon as precedent by the Supreme Court.
C. What do these cases tell us about Justice Marshall's Court in ifs
opinion writing?
Chief Justice Marshall did not begin with the jurisdictional issue in
either Marbury or Cherokee Nation. He could have disposed of the case
on the jurisdictional issue but would have been unable to decide the
issues he really wanted to decide, such as judicial review, the
interpretation of sovereignty for state and federal governments, and the
preservation of the power of the United States Supreme Court-the latter
perhaps most important.
In Marbury, the opinion avoided ordering Jefferson to deliver the
appointments, which it would have had great difficulty accomplishing,
since these political appointments made by the previous President. And
in Worcester, Georgia granted a pardon to Worcester rather than accede
to the United States Supreme Court judgment, but thereby avoided a
confrontation and preserved the power of the Supreme Court.
III. COMMERCE CLAUSE-THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE
The discussion of the Commerce Clause28 gives rise to the question:
what is the Indian Commerce Clause, 29 and is it analyzed differently?
In Rice v. Cayetano,3° Justice Stevens wrote:
Throughout our Nation's history, this Court has recognized both the
plenary power of Congress over the affairs of the native Americans and the
fiduciary character of the special federal relationship with descendants of
those once sovereign peoples.., and.., as long as the special treatment
can be tied rationally to fulfillment of Congress' unique obligations
towards the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed.3 1
That plenary power is found in the Indian Commerce Clause, which
26. Id. at 528-29.
27. Id. at 596. The U.S. Supreme Court had no ability to enforce this decision, and
Georgia kept Worcester in jail for another year before granting him a pardon-maling a
confrontation unnecessary.
28. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
29. I.
30. 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
31. Id. at 529-32 (citations and quotations omitted).
20011 543
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provides that Congress has the power to "regulate Commerce... with
the Indian tribes."32 Relying upon this enumerated power, the United
States Supreme Court in Morton v. Mancari,3* concluded that Congress
could therefore single out Indians as a proper subject for separate
legislation.34
The test for whether Congress can single out Indians for special
legislation, as described in Rice, is the rational basis test. Legislation
will be constitutional "as long as the special treatment can be tied
rationally to fulfillment of Congress' unique obligations towards the
Indians....
Unlike legislation under the Indian Commerce Clause, legislation
under the Interstate Commerce Clause is reviewed with an additional
test for whether there is a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. 6
There is no "substantial effect" test in the Indian Commerce Clause,
based upon the broad plenary power held by Congress. Thus, the Indian
Commerce Clause power is broader than the Interstate Commerce
Clause power.
IV. WAR POWERS AND TREATIES -TREATIES WITH INDIAN NATIONS
War powers and treaties must necessarily raise the question: what
is the legal status of a treaty with an Indian Nation? Are they foreign
nations under the Constitution?
The Executive Branch typically negotiates treaties for Congressional
ratification. However, Congress, tired of little control of the treaty
making process with Indians, 8 passed the Appropriations Act of March
3, 1871, which ended the Executive's treatymaking authority by stating:
Provided, that hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent
nation, tribe or power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty: Provided further, that nothing herein contained shall be construed
to invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made
and ratified with any Indian nation or tribe.
39
32. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
33. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
34. Id.
35. Rice, 528 U.S. at 531-32.
36. See Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs., 531 U.S. 159
(2001).
37. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 398-424 (1993) ("[In
Worchester [Chief Justice Marshall] signaled that further encroachment upon tribe-the
ongoing process of colonization-would receive no special assistance from the judiciary.
The executive branch, when it negotiated treaties, and the Senate, when it ratified them,
were the only institutions appropriate to do the problematic work for further colonization.
The judiciary would not enforce their work unless it was compelled to do so.").
38. Id.
39. Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (now codified at 25
544 [Vol. 37:539
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Congress had become impatient with their lack of power, given that the
Senate, alone, ratified treaties with tribal nations.
This action by Congress to limit the President's authority may raise
a separation of power issue: was this constitutional or a violation of the
separation of powers? Since the President carefully protects the power to
negotiate and enter into treaties with other nations, why did the
President not object to this abolishment of the President's power to make
treaties with Indian nations? Treatymaking continued in the form of
agreements for many decades. 40  The most likely reason that the
President did not object is that whoever was in office likely viewed the
treaties with the Indians as problematic, and most of the "hostilities" had
ended by this time.
The treaties ratified by the Senate have the force of law. However,
the Supreme Court or other inferior federal courts interpret them.
Various canons of construction have evolved from the case law in these
interpretations; including the canon that implied hunting and fishing
rights were included in treaties although not specifically mentioned, and
the canon that reductions in reservation lands had to be made expressly
by Congress. 4 1 A broad canon of construction requires that treaties
must be interpreted in terms of what the understanding of the tribes
would have been at the time the treaties were made; and they must be
42
construed in favor of tribes where the language is vague.
Two remedies exist when Indian treaties are violated: compensation
and land or federal recognition bringing federal money.
Another interesting question that arises, is whether the United
States still recognizes treaties between the tribes and the colonies prior
to 1776. Pre-Constitutional treaties are recognized with successor-in-
interest logic; the United States is the successor to the colonies. 43 But a
different relationship arises in the consideration of the treaties made
U.S.C. § 71 (1982)).
40. Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 67 (U. N.M. Press 1972) (originally
published 1942).
41. Frickey, supra n. 37, at 400 ("First, Chief Justice Marshall stressed that the treaty
was negotiated and written in English, a language foreign to the tribal negotiators. They
should not have been expected, therefore, to distinguish the word 'allotted' from the words
'marked out' Nor would the words 'hunting ground' have suggested any limitation to the
tribe, because hunting was at that time the principal occupation of the Indians, and their
land was more used for that purpose than for any other. In other words, the term 'hunting
ground' should be construed as the Indians would have understood it-complete land
possession and control-rather than as non-Indians would have-at most an exclusive
license to hunt").
42. Id.
43. See generally Barry E. Hill & Nicholas Targ, The Link Between Protecting Natural
Resources and the Issues of Environmental Justice, 28 B.C. Envit. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 30 n. 158
(2000) ("The Treaty of 1677, between the Mattaponi Indian and Pamunkey tribes and the
English Crown, is known as the Treaty at Middle Plantation.' The Commonwealth stands
as the successor to the Crown. See 1976-1977 Op. Va. Atty. Gen. 107, 108; Baker v.
Harvey, 181 U.S. 481 (1901).").
2001] 545
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between Indian nations and the Republic of Texas. A treaty made
between the Republic of Texas and the Texas Cherokees was not
assumed by the United States when Texas joined the United States.4 4
Since Texas was considered a different country, the United States did
not succeed to interest in Texas's treaties.45  The Indian Claims
Commission heard this case in the 1950s.4 6
V. 14TH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION-WHAT IS THE INDIAN STATUS
ANALYSIS? MORTON V. MANCAi
The case of equality is a complex issue as applied to American
Indians; and many practicing attorneys, usually amenable to learning
new law, often refuse to take such cases because of the different
Constitutional and statutory status of Indians. The question of equality
is one such area of Indian law that differs markedly from law applied to
non-Indians.
In Rice, Justice Stevens summarized the current state of the law:
As our cases have consistently recognized, Congress' plenary power over
these peoples has been exercised time and again to implement a federal
duty to provide native peoples with special 'care and protection ....
[Today], the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs [administers] countless
modem programs responding to pragmatic concerns, including health,
education, housing and impoverishment. Federal regulation in this area is
not limited to the strictly practical but has encompassed as well the
protection of cultural values ....
[This] Court has taken account of the 'numerous' occasions' on which
'legislation that singles out Indians for particular and special treatment'
has been upheld and has concluded that as 'long as the special treatment
can be tied rationally to fulfillment of Congress' unique obligations
towards the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed.'47
In Morton, the United States Supreme Court held that Indian
preference was not subject to strict scrutiny because these were political
distinctions, not racial distinctions.4 8
In Morton, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 ("IRA") was
challenged because it accorded a hiring preference for qualified Indians
in the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"). 49 The IRA was intended to give
44. Indian Claims Commission Decisions, Texas-Cherokees v. U.S., 526, vol. I-B (Nov.
13, 1835), P1. Ex.l at 111.
45. Indian Claims Commission Decisions, Texas-Cherokees v. U.S., 522 at 532, vol. I-B
(Dec. 28, 1953).
46. Id. (The Indian Claims Commission no longer exists, and the remaining caseload
was assigned to the U.S. Court of Claims.).
47. Rice, 528 U.S. at 529-30 (citing U.S. v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913)): Morton, 417
U.S. at 554-55).
48. Morton, 417 U.S. at 554.
49. Id. at 537.
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Indians greater participation in their own self-government; to further the
government's trust obligation toward the Indian tribes; and, to reduce
the negative effect of having non-Indians administer matters that affect
Indian tribal life.50 Non-Indian BIA employees challenged this preference
as contrary to the anti-discrimination provisions of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.5' The District Court held that the
1934 Act had been implicitly repealed by the 1972 Act.52
The court relied upon the intent of Congress through a reading of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,s3 which explicitly exempted from
coverage the preferential employment of Indians by Indian tribes or by
industries located on or near Indian reservation. This, the United States
Supreme Court found, revealed a clear Congressional recognition of the
unique legal status of tribal and reservation-based activities, opining,
"The anti-discrimination provision, aimed at alleviating minority
discrimination in employment, obviously is designed to deal with an
entirely different and, indeed, opposite problem. Any perceived conflict
is thus more apparent than real."54
The Court further relied upon the plenary power of Congress found
in Article I, section 8, clause 3, providing Congress with the power to
"regulate Commerce... with the Indian tribes," and thus to single
Indians out as a proper subject for separate legislation. 55
The holding in Morton explains why the traditional equal protection
analysis does not apply:
The preference is not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of
'indians;' instead, it applies only to members of 'federally recognized'
tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be
classified as 'indians.' In this sense, the preference is political rather than
racial in nature.5 6
Justices Steven and Ginsberg dissent in the case of Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 7 mischaracterizes the treatment of
American Indians:
We should reject a concept of 'consistency' that would view the special
preferences that the National Government has provided to Native
Americans since 1834 as comparable to the official discrimination against
African Americans that was prevalent for much of our history.
58
50. Id. at 542.
51. Id. at 539.
52. Id. at 540.
53. 42 U.S.CA.. §§ 2000e(b), 2000(e)2(i) (West 2001) (formerly § 701(b) and § 703(1)).
54. Morton, 417 U.S. at 550.
55. Id. at 552.
56. Id. at 554 n. 24.
57. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
58. Id. at 244-5. The dissent went on to explain:
To be eligible for the preference in 1974, an individual had to 'be one fourth or
20011 547
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However, by relying solely upon the plenary power of Congress as
comparable to the application of the Fourteenth Amendment through
legislative power of Congress, the dissent ignores that the political
distinction is based upon the government-to-government relationship of
tribal governments to the state or federal government. Therefore, not all
racial Indians enjoy the preference given by Congress to members of
tribes recognized by the state or federal governments.
VI. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND LOVING V. VIRGINIA: THE MISCEGENATION
STATUTES
Loving v. Virginia, 9 represents the last vestiges of the application of
the Fourteenth Amendment to discriminatory state legislation, because
it was not discriminatory on its face.60 As Virginia argued in Loving, it
applied the prohibition equally to both whites and non-whites. 61 Anti-
miscegenation statutes were intended to preserve whiteness; therefore
they prohibited whites from intermarrying with African-Americans as
well as with American Indians.6 2
Virginia had not always been hostile to intermarriage with American
Indians. The first recorded marriage between a white settler and an
American Indian was the famous marriage of John Rolfe and
Pocahontas, daughter of Powhatan, in 1614, in Virginia. 63 But it was
not without its social taboo. The mixing of native races was contrary to
religious beliefs about purity based on a scriptural ban of such
marriages; however diplomacy proved to be the more important
principle, and this policy was largely a diplomatic effort to create peace
between the settlers and the Indians.64 When that effort failed in 1622
with the Powhatan Uprising, the idea of biracial marriages as a
diplomatic measure ended.65
Early Virginia had few Indian-white marriages.66 According to one
more degree Indian blood and be a member of a Federally-recognized tribe ....
We concluded that the classification was not 'racial' because it did not encompass
all Native Americans. In upholding it, we relied in part on the plenary power of
Congress to legislate on behalf of Indian tribes. In this case respondents rely, in
part, on the fact that not all members of the preferred minority groups are eligible
for the preference, and on the special power to legislate on behalf of minorities
granted to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 244 n. 3 (citations omitted).
59. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 9.
62. Id.
63. Karen M. Woods, Law Making: A "Wicked and Mischievous Connection:" The Origins
ofIndian-White Miscegenation Law, 23 Legal Stud. Forum 37, 49 (1999).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. David D. Smits, "Abominable Mixture:" Toward the Repudiation of Anglo-Indian
Intermarriage in Seventeenth-Century Virginia, 95 Va. Mag. Hist. and Biography 166-67,
173-75, 184 (Apr. 1987).
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writer "English anxieties, insecurities, and ethnocentrism, manifested in
suspicion, discrimination, verbal abuse, exclusiveness, and violent
aggression toward Indians, were the paramount deterrents to
intermarriage.... Indian resentments, rebelliousness, marital customs,
and female matrimonial preferences" led to few Indian-white marriages. 67
Indians were also routinely enslaved during the colonial wars as spoils of
war, and continued to be held in slavery until the mid 1700s in spite of
laws to the contrary.r8
Reviving the old diplomatic strategy, Patrick Henry introduced a bill
in the Virginia Assembly in 1784 offering financial incentives "for the
encouragement of marriages with the Indians.... That the offspring of
the intermarriages aforesaid, shall be entitled, in all respects, to the
same rights and privileges, under the laws of this commonwealth, as if
they had proceeded from intermarriages among free white inhabitants
thereof."69 This measure failed to pass the Virginia legislature.
In the early 1800s, Thomas Jefferson advocated the use of Indian-
white intermarriages as a way of adapting the Indians to white culture,
rather than continuing a policy of genocide and devastation of the Indian
population; thereby eliminating the "Indian problem."70 In fact, this
policy was supported by "every administration from Washington to John
Quincy Adams and a variety of private philanthropic organizations." 71
Jefferson wrote to Creek agent Colonel Benjamin Hawkins in 1803 that
"In truth, the ultimate point of rest and happiness for them is to let our
settlements and theirs meet and blend together, to intermix and become
one people. Incorporating themselves with us as citizens of the United
"72States. In his speeches to the Indians, Jefferson encouraged this
policy saying, "we shall all be Americans; you will mix with us by
marriage, your blood will run in our veins, and will spread over this
great island."7 3 Jefferson saw these intermarriages as a progression in
the future, but did not believe it would be a policy for the present.74 This
was consistent with the federal Indian policy to remain friendly with
Indians to subvert alliances with Britain or other foreign powers. This
insurance was to pay off handsomely in the War of 1812 where Indians
fought on the side of the Americans, potentially making the difference in
67. Id.
68. See generally Barbara Olexer, The Enslavement of the American Indian (Library
Research Assoc. 1982)
69. William Wirt, Life and Character of Patrick Henry 258 (A.L. Burt Co. 1817).
70. Bernard W. Sheehan, Seeds ofExtinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American
Indian 15-44 (U. N.C. Press 1973).
71. Id.
72. Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 10 (Andrew Lipscomb & Albert
Ellegy Berg eds.. 1903-04) (Letter to Col. Hawkins, Feb. 18, 1803).
73. Thomas Jefferson, The Complete Jefferson 503 (Saul Padover ed., 1943) (letter to
Capt. Hendrick, the Delawares Mohiccons, and Munries (no date)).
74. Sheehan, supra n. 70, at 55.
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what was a critically close contest.
In 1816, the Secretary of War, who was charged with Indian
responsibilities, was required to report to Congress under the 1791
Trade and Intercourse Act.75 William H. Crawford, Secretary of War,
proposed the controversial policy of intermarriages between whites and
Indians in order to develop the idea of holding property by individuals
rather than as commons among the Indians. He wrote, "When every
effort to introduce among them ideas of separate property shall fail, let
intermarriages between them and the whites be encouraged by the
Government. This cannot fail to preserve the race, with the
modifications necessary to the enjoyment of civil liberty and social
happiness. " 7 6 This proposal, however, did not serve Crawford wel when
he ran for president in 1824. His opponent's campaign pamphlet
explained that "Crawford's positions on interracial marriage make him
unfit to be president and a dangerous threat to the nation."
77
The removal period of the 1830s created a revival in the
enforcement of these miscegenation statutes in the southeastern
states. 78 Indians not living on reservations were subject to the civil
jurisdiction of the state and they were classified as "people of color" in an
effort to reinforce the belief that all of the Indians in the east had been
removed. 
With this history, it would seem logical that among the amici briefs
submitted in Loving that American Indians would be represented.
However, they were not: North Carolina was the only state that
submitted an aniicus curiae brief; and the associations, the Japanese
American Citizen's League and the NAACP Legal Defense Education
Fund submitted briefs. Why no American Indians? The answer is
probably that the Native American Rights Fund and the American Indian
Movement were both founded after Loving, and there was no
organization representing the rights of individual American Indians.
The holding in Loving that the miscegenation statutes were
unconstitutional, extended to all those states statutes which included
American Indians as a class of exclusion.
VII. CIVIL RIGHTS -DOES THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT MEAN THE SAME
THING AS THE BILL OF RIGHTS?
The Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA) 8 ° was to provide to Indians
75. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994).
76. American State Papers (Indian Affairs) vol. 2, 26-28 (U.S. Govt. 1832-34).
77. Id.
78. See Victoria Sutton, We Don't Have Indians Here Anymore: The Political Genocide of
the American Indian in North Carolina (Carolina Academic Press 2001).
79. Id.
80. 25 U.S.C.A. §1301 et seq. (West 2001).
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subject to tribal governmental actions, eight of the same rights contained
in the Bill of Rights. However, the ICRA is not identical to the Bill of
Rights.
The ICRA was tested in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,8 l where
82gender discrimination was the issue. Respondent tribe member sought
to prevent enforcement of a tribal ordinance that denied tribe
membership to children of female tribe members who married outside
the tribe, but not to the children of male tribe members who did so. 3
The respondent claimed that this violated Title I of the ICRA,
discriminating on the basis of both sex and ancestry.84
The federal district court held that equal protection analysis applied
to the ICRA, but that the balance to be struck between these competing
interests was better left to the judgment of the Pueblo tribal
government.85 The district court majority wrote that "to abrogate tribal
decisions, particularly in the delicate area of membership, for whatever
'good' reasons, is to destroy cultural identity under the guise of saving
it."8
6
The United States Supreme Court found that since this practice
reflected traditional values of patriarchy still significant in tribal life, and
since membership rules are vital to the tribe's survival as a cultural and
economic entity, traditional equal protection analysis did not apply. The
district court opined:
The equal protection guarantee of the Indian Civil Rights Act should not
be construed in a manner which would require or authorize this Court to
determine which traditional values will promote cultural survival and
should therefore be preserved.... Such a determination should be made
by the people of Santa Clara; not only because they can best decide what
values are important, but also because they must live with the decision
every day .... 87
The Supreme Court held that tribes retain their original natural rights to
self-government.m
Further, the United States Supreme Court held that the writ of
habeas corpus is the only mechanism by which the federal court can
hear claims under the ICRA.39 This virtually put an end to claims being
made under the ICRA.




85. Martinez v. Romney, 402 F. Supp. 5. 18 (D. N.M. 1975).
86. I& at 18-19.
87. Id.
88. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 63-64.
89. Id. at 61-62.
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VIII. VO'rING-A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
In Shaw v. Reno,90 the United States Supreme Court found that a
redistricting plan was unconstitutional because it was so irregular on its
face that racial discrimination in voting must be concluded as the
motivation.
The Fourteenth Amendment adopted in 1868 precluded Indians
from the grant of citizenship and thereby precluded Indians from
voting. 91 Indians were granted citizenship in 1924, and thereafter the
one-man-one-vote standard applied. In Goodluck v. Apache County,9 2 the
court ruled that where one of the three designated county districts was
the Navajo Nation, which was six times as large as the next largest
district, the county must be reapportioned to avoid a political majority of
non-Indian districts. This was based upon the one-man-one-vote
principle; not on the basis of Shaw.
IX. FIFrH AMENDMENT-TAKINGS CLAUSE
Out of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause93 discussions, a
question concerning the application of the Takings Clause to Indian
lands might naturally arise. After all, given the takings analysis for
physical invasions,94 as well as regulatory takings, the federal
government's actions of taking Indian land would seem obvious. The
takings analysis concludes that if a government regulation "goes too
far",95 there will be a compensable taking. Further, the "abridgment of
property rights through the police power... [must prove to be]
substantially advancing a legitimate state interest,"96 and there must be
an "essential nexus" between the governmental action and the
governmental interst.
97
However, the analysis here is also different and a three-part test is
applied. First, the court asks what kind of property is involved.If the
land is aboriginal (not granted by treaty) it is not compensable under the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.98 In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States,99 the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, an Alaskan clan of the Tlingit Tribe,
were not compensated for over 350,000 acres of land based on their
90. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
91. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
92. 417 F. Supp. 13 (D. Ariz. 1975), affd sub. nom., Apache County v. U.S., 429 U.S. 876
(1976).
93. U.S. Const. amend. V.
94. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
95. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
96. Nollan v. CaL Coastal Commn., 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
97. Id. at 837.
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mere Indian right of occupancy.' 0 If the property is not aboriginal, then
the second question is whether there was a taking. This is a different
analysis inherent in the federal government trustee relationship. In the
case of the Sioux Nation and the taking of the Black Hills,1"" the court
found that although the federal government provided rations for the
Nation since the federal government acquired the Black Hills through an
act of Congress in 1877, the rations were clearly not intended to be
equivalent to the value of the land. The court further concluded that the
1877 was a breach of the Treaty of Fort Laramie and the land had been
taken "in a way that wholly deprived [the Sioux Nation] of their property
rights.....
0 2
X. FIRST AMENDMENT, FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE-DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
RESOURCES OF OREGON V. SMITH
The Free Exercise Clause analysis as applied to tribal cultural
practices is analyzed no differently than when applied to other groups or
individuals. After the decision in Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith,'0 3 Congress reacted by passing the Religious Freedom
and Restoration Act. 104 Smith involved the challenge to the
criminalization of peyote use by the members of the Native American
Church. Alfred Smith and Galen Black were fired from their jobs with a
private drug rehabilitation organization because they had used peyote at
a ceremony of the Native American Church, where they were members.
They were determined by the employment commission to have been
discharged for work-related misconduct that resulted in the denial of
unemployment benefits. The Religious Freedom and Restoration Act
sought to correct this burden on religion by providing that the
government could only burden religion by showing a compelling state
interest and by using the least restrictive means. The Supreme Court
held that the act was unconstitutional, because Congress could not
expand the constitutional free exercise clause through legislation.1 06
XI. TENTH AMENDMENT
Tribal governments are sovereigns and have sovereign powers.1
07
However, the Tenth Amendment does not reserve powers to tribal
governments as it does to state governments. However, some scholars
100. Id. at 279.
101. U.S. v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
102. Id.
103. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
104. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(b) et seq. (West 2001).
105. Id.
106. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
107. Cherokee Nation, 31 U.S. 1; Worcester, 30 U.S. 1.
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have found a reservation for tribes in a combination of treaties and the
concept of inherent sovereignty. For example, Charles F. Wilkinson has
written that tribes are a "third source of sovereignty in the United
States... [and therefore] the rule of law requires that tribes continue to
be reconciled into our constitutional system. "1° 8
This concept of sovereignty has resulted in a presumption against
the encroachment of state jurisdiction over Indian affairs. This concept
of sovereignty has resulted in a presumption against the encroachment
of state jurisdiction over Indian affairs, after the Court determined that
sovereignty was assumed where a balancing test found that areas of
tribal sovereignty were not inconsistent with state law, and the tribes
were limited only in that they did not have jurisdiction over non-
Indians.109 However, the Supreme Court later reversed that
presumption. Instead, tribes are presumed not to have sovereignty
unless two exceptions are met: (1) the state law is inconsistent with
independent tribal status; and (2) there is either a consensual agreement
by the tribe or a Congressional grant of authority for state regulation."0
The application of state law to tribal reservations is governed more by
the subject matter and the character of the reservation, leading to a very
fluid analysis of these issues. For example, where self-government of a
cultural issue is at stake, the tribal government will be more likely to
have jurisdiction, and not the state."' However, in zoning issues, often
the state will be found to have jurisdiction over tribal land, if the
character of the reservation is not predominately tribal." 
2
XII. PREEMPTION
Preemption, arising from the Supremacy Clause,13 is also analyzed
differently from preemption for the states and federal governments.
Tribal interests are weighed against state interests and federal interests
to determine whether the state interest will preempt the federal interest.
In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, "14 federal law preempted state
law where the tribe sought to govern its own natural resources by
regulating hunting and fishing on the reservation for members and
nonmembers. The state was preempted from applying its own state
hunting and fishing regulations." 5 Here, the court found that the
108. Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time and the Law: Native Societies in a
Modem Constitutional Democracy 103-04 (Yale U. Press 1987).
109. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
110. See Mont v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
111. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
112. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct.
2994 (1989).
113. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
114. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
115. Id. at 344.
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interests of the tribe in managing its own resources and in economic
development outweighed any state interest."1 6
XIII. CONCLUSION
Steven McSloy has observed that "the treatment of American
Indians in the study of American constitutional law has largely been
ignored."117 He further notes that the leading constitutional treatise,
Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe's American Constitutional Law
deals with Indians largely in footnotes.1 8 In The Brethren, Bob
Woodward wrote that the Justices considered Indian cases to be
"peewee" matters, and "Chief Justice Burger would punish junior
Justices by making them write Indian law opinions.""19
Rennard Strickland observed that in his early years of teaching in
the 1970s, he spoke with a number of professors who had worked with
Indian law at some time in the past, and he said that
A number of them told me that they had taught Indian Law in their
Constitutional Law courses and had begun to move it into other
courses.... It is jurisprudentially so tasty that once people who are very
bright have seen what is there, they find it hard to go back to A to B
remainder to C. 2 °
If this was a trend in the 1970s, it appears that the pendulum since
swung in the opposite direction for many of the next class of legal
academicians in the 1980s and 1990s. Let us hope that the pendulum,
in the early 2000s, must therefore be swinging toward an incorporation
of Indian law into required course materials.
116. Id. at 343.
117. Steven Paul McSloy, Border Wars: Haudenosaunee Lands and Federalism, 46 Buff. L.
Rev. 1041, 1041 (1998).
118. Id
119. Bob Woodward, & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (Simon &
Schuster 1979).
120. Rennard Strickland & Gloria Valencia-Weber, Observations on the Evolution of Indian
Law in the Law Schools, 26 N.M. L. Rev. 153, 156 (1996).
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